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ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
Interim State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #6555 
 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #7353 
P.O. Box 2816 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 334-2712 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 43876 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR 2014-16626 
v.     ) 
     ) 
MICHAEL JAMES    ) 
MCNEARNEY, JR.,   ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________) 
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Michael McNearney, Jr., pled guilty to two counts 
of grand theft and one count of rape.  He received a unified sentence of seven years, 
with three years fixed.  On appeal, Mr. McNearney contends that this sentence 
represents an abuse of the district court’s discretion, as it is excessive given any view of 
the facts. 
   
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
In 2012 and 2013, Michael McNearney borrowed money from several different 
women with whom he had a dating relationship.  (Presentence Investigation Report 
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(hereinafter, PSI),1 pp.21-22.)  He obtained the money by telling the women he would 
pay them back with money he planned to earn from gambling or by working a job.  (PSI, 
pp.21-22.)  He also borrowed or took without permission their debit or credit cards and 
withdrew money which he kept.  (PSI, pp.21-22.)  Over the course of two years, 
Mr. McNearney obtained approximately $26,000 from three women.  (PSI, pp.21-22; 
R., pp.452-453.)  Mr. McNearney failed to repay the money as promised, and utilized 
the funds for his own personal purposes.  (PSI, pp.21-22.)  During the course of his 
relationships with these women, he had sexual intercourse with them.  (PSI, pp.21-22.)  
While none of the women immediately reported him to the authorities following the 
sexual acts, some of them felt the encounters were forced and they were unwilling 
participants, and told Mr. McNearney to stop and/or physically resisted during the 
encounters.  (PSI, pp.21-22.) 
Based on these facts, Mr. McNearney was charged by Information with two 
counts of grand theft by deception, two counts of grand theft of a financial transaction 
card, and seven counts of rape.  (R., pp.141-146.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Mr. McNearney pled guilty to an amended information charging him with two counts of 
grand theft by deception and entered an Alford2 plea to one count of rape.  (9/1/15 
Tr., p.23, Ls.4-20; p.27, L.10 – p.28, L.1; R., pp.424-427.)  In exchange, the State 
agreed to dismiss the remaining charges so long as Mr. McNearney agreed to pay 
restitution on all counts, including those dismissed.  (9/1/15 Tr., p.3, Ls.17-25; p.12, L.7 
– p.13, L.22; R., p.427.)  The State also agreed not to file additional charges related to 
                                            
1 Appellant’s use of the designation “PSI” includes the electronic file containing the PSI, 
including the Addendum to the PSI, the Substance Abuse Evaluation, and the 
Psychosexual Evaluation. 
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the discovered materials.  (9/1/15 Tr., p.13, Ls.10-14; R., p.427.)  As for sentencing, if 
the results of the psychosexual evaluation were to find Mr. McNearney is a high risk to 
reoffend, the parties agreed that the sentences for the three charges would be an 
imposed seven years, with three years fixed, concurrent with each other.  (9/1/15 
Tr., p.12, Ls.20-25.)  If the psychosexual evaluation were to find Mr. McNearney was a 
low or moderate risk to reoffend, the parties agreed that they could recommend any 
underlying sentence, but would jointly recommend that the district court retain 
jurisdiction.  (9/1/15 Tr., p.13, Ls.4-9.)  The plea agreement was binding on the district 
court, pursuant to I.C.R. 11(f)(1)(B).  (9/1/15 Tr., p.12, L.20 – p.13, L.9.)   
At the sentencing hearing, the parties asked the district court to follow the plea 
agreement.  (11/12/15 Tr., p.106, Ls.10-20; p.112, Ls.1-6.)  The district court sentenced 
Mr. McNearney to a total unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed.  
(11/12/15 Tr., p.120, Ls.13-18; R., pp.452-455.)  Mr. McNearney filed a timely notice of 
appeal.  (R., pp.461-464.) 
 
ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of seven 
years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. McNearney following his plea of guilty to two 
counts of grand theft and one count of rape? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
2 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).  
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Seven 
Years, With Three Years Fixed, Upon Mr. McNearney Following His Plea Of Guilty To 
Two Counts Of Grand Theft And One Count Of Rape  
 
 Mindful that the district court imposed the sentence negotiated pursuant to a plea 
agreement and recommended by defense counsel, Mr. McNearney asserts that, given 
any view of the facts, his unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, is 
excessive.  Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an 
excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of 
the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the 
offender, and the protection of the public interest.  See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 
(Ct. App. 1982).   
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.’”  State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).  Mr. McNearney does not allege 
that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.  Accordingly, in order to show an 
abuse of discretion, Mr. McNearney must show that in light of the governing criteria, the 
sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts.  Id.  The governing criteria or 
objectives of criminal punishment are:  (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.  Id.  
In light of Mr. McNearney’s rehabilitative potential, and the other mitigating facts 
present in this case, the district court abused its discretion in sentencing him 
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excessively.  The district court failed to consider the fact that Mr. McNearney was aware 
of his alcohol problem, was interested in seeking treatment for his addiction, and that, 
with programming, Mr. McNearney could likely be successful in the community.  (PSI, 
pp.38-39, 43.) 
Another fact to be taken into consideration by the district court was that 
Mr. McNearney has been diagnosed with anti-social personality disorder, ADHD, and 
bipolar disorder.  (PSI, pp.36-38, 43.)  The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that 
Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial court to consider a defendant’s mental illness 
as a sentencing factor.  Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).   
The Idaho Supreme Court has also held that substance abuse should be 
considered as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence.  
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982).  In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a 
sentence based on Nice’s lack of prior record and the fact that “the trial court did not 
give proper consideration of the defendant’s alcoholic problem, the part it played in 
causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the 
problem.”  Id. at 91.  Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that ingestion of 
drugs and alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of conduct, 
could be a mitigating circumstance.  State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 (1981). 
Mr. McNearney committed the crimes while under the influence of alcohol.  
(11/12/15 Tr., p.99, L.18 – p.100, L.12.)  He described “going day-to-day in an alcoholic 
stupor.”  (11/12/15 Tr., p.99, Ls.18-24.)  Mr. McNearney first used alcohol at age 12 and 
knows he has an alcohol issue.  (PSI, pp.38, 43.)  However, Mr. McNearney has 
realized he needs to stop drinking alcohol and wants treatment.  (PSI, pp.38-39, 43.)  
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Mr. McNearney explained to the presentence investigator that “the accountability and 
structure of an Intensive Outpatient program would keep him on track.”  (PSI, p.38.) 
Further, Mr. McNearney expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for his 
actions.  (PSI, pp.23; 11/12/15 Tr., p. 99, L.18 – p.102, L.2; 9/1/15 Tr., p.27, L.10 – p.28, 
L.1.)  Regarding the circumstances surrounding his offense, Mr. McNearney expressed 
that he felt “like a user and a sinner.”  (PSI, p.23.)  Mr. McNearney also wanted the 
court to know “I let my selfishness and instant gratification ruin my life and not caring 
how it affects other[s].”  (PSI, p.23.)  He wanted the court to know that he was “too 
dependent on other people and took advantage of other people for their money and 
regrets it every day.”  (PSI, p.23.)  At his sentencing hearing, Mr. McNearney 
apologized to the victim present in the courtroom for his actions.  (11/12/15 Tr., p.101, 
L.23 – p.102, L.2.)  Mr. McNearney wanted the court to know that his goal was to spend 
every day of the rest of his life making up for the damage he caused.  (11/12/15 
Tr., p.101, Ls.2-5.)  Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant 
expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts.  Shideler, 103 
Idaho at 595; State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).   
Mindful that the district court followed the recommendations of defense counsel, 
Mr. McNearney asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence upon him.  He asserts that had the district court properly 
considered his remorse, substance abuse, and mental health conditions, it would have 
imposed a less severe sentence.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Mr. McNearney respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district 
court for a new sentencing hearing. 
 DATED this 6th day of October, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      SALLY J. COOLEY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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